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ABSTRACT
Drawing on a new dataset the article investigates a case study of the population 
of interest representatives lobbying the European Parliament. It examines the role 
of economic and cultural resources to account for the representation of organised 
interests from different EU member states. It adds to the existing literature on 
the density of organised interests by showing that in addition to economic 
resources, cultural capital plays a significant role in stimulating the activity of 
organised interests. Whether countries have a high number of organised interests 
in the parliament’s interest group community depends on both whether they 
are economically prosperous and how large a share of their citizens participate 
in associational life. In addition, the findings demonstrate how the ranking of 
countries in the population of organised interests lobbying the parliament 
depends on the benchmark used to measure density.
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During the frequent waves of negotiations about its institutional structure, the 
EU has often revealed an inherent tension in the balance of power between 
representatives from the member states in its formal bodies. As an example, 
the balance of seats between the member states has been a complex issue in 
the European Parliament (EP) (Corbett et al. 2007).1 In September 2007, when 
members of the European Parliament (MEPs) debated their own proposal for 
the redistribution of its seats, one of the two co-rapporteurs of the parliament on 
the matter, Mr. Lamassoure, emphasised how ‘reason and logic should prevail 
over passion and national interest’2 on an issue which he later characterised as 
‘a hot potato’.3 The question of how the EP should be composed is important in 
light of the substantial increase in its powers over the last decades. The EP has 
gone from being a consultative body with limited powers to acting as a co-legis-
lator in the vast share of EU legislative areas (Burns et al. 2013; Lehmann 2009).
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The expansion of EP power has made it a more attractive venue for lobbyists 
and has given rise to increased attention from the interest group community 
(e.g. Kohler-Koch 1997; Marshall 2010; Rasmussen 2015; Wessels 1999). The 
relative emphasis on lobbying the EP as opposed to other venues has risen. 
Studies of companies have shown that these devote an increasing share of their 
resources towards lobbying the EP (Coen 1997). Of the 8462 actors listed in the 
EU Transparency Register in April 2015, 2044 held one or more passes to the 
EP.4 This is a high share given that many of the organised interests listed in 
the Transparency Register are unlikely to have a permanent physical presence 
in Brussels.
Organised interests lobbying the EP exist in many forms including mem-
bership associations, firms, think tanks and national institutions (Baroni et al. 
2014). There are various ways of classifying the interests they represent. Some 
actors can be grouped according to functional, substantive interests (such as 
producers, consumers or labour) whereas for other types of actors such a clas-
sification is harder to make. At the same time, a substantial share of the organ-
ised interests present in Brussels have their roots in different member states 
(Eising et al. 2017; Rasmussen and Gross 2015; Wonka et al. 2010). Yet, to date, 
research on the population density of organised interests in the EU has focused 
on explaining variation in the number of organised interests between different 
policy issues and areas (Broscheid and Coen 2007; Coen and Katsaitis 2013; 
Rasmussen et al. 2014) as well as between economic and social sectors of group 
activity (Berkhout et al. 2015; Messer et al. 2011) rather than between countries.
Our analysis makes two important contributions: we perform the first sys-
tematic study of the population density of interest groups from different member 
states lobbying the EP. We pay attention to their absolute number as well as to 
relative measures of the density of these organised interests. Regarding the latter, 
we place the national interest organisations in relation to different country-spe-
cific benchmarks (see also Gray and Lowery 2000) such as the size of the national 
economy, the size of the national population and the country’s number of seats 
in the EP. These benchmarks help us to link the examination of interest group 
density to the wider study of descriptive representation in the EP.5 Second, we 
add to existing work on the density of organised interests in the US and the EU 
(for a recent review, see Berkhout et al. 2015) by considering not only economic 
but also cultural resources as a source of the density of an interest group popu-
lation. Relying on the social capital literature (see e.g. Andrews 2011; Boix and 
Posner 1998; Putnam 1993; Tavits 2006) we develop our argument that cultural 
resources also serve as important push factors for the mobilisation of organised 
interests vis-à-vis the EP. We hypothesise that a strong national associational 
culture stimulates the volume of national, organised interests active in the EP. 
Our analysis is based on a new dataset of the population of organised interests 
registered to lobby the EP between 2005 and 2009. The data was coded in the 
European-wide INTEREURO project (Beyers et al. 2014).
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It is essential to understand how well represented national interest groups are 
in the EU system in an institution such as the EP, which is a co-legislator in the 
vast share of the policies dealt with by the EU. Moreover, it is widely recognised 
that organised interests play a particularly prominent role in the EU. In the EU’s 
political system, political parties do not play the same role as in the member 
states when it comes to transmitting public views to decision-makers (Lindberg 
et al. 2008). Instead there is a high emphasis on securing legitimacy through 
the involvement of civil society whose participation is actively encouraged 
and financially supported by the EU institutions.6 Clearly, organised interests 
need to respond to a range of different principals apart from their national 
constituency as a whole: Organised interests typically represent different sub-
stantive interests irrespective of which country they come from. At the same 
time, territorial interests are also important in the complex EU construction, 
which is still far from being an actual state. Rather it forms a political system 
in which national divisions between countries with different attitudes towards 
European integration play a role in many political discussions alongside other 
types of conflicts (Marks and Steenbergen 2004).
Our findings underline the value of considering the number of organised 
interests in relation to different benchmarks. These help us to obtain a more 
nuanced picture of the density of different national populations of organised 
interests lobbying the EP. Our findings show important similarities between 
various countries in the relative density of their organised interests even though 
the choice of benchmark also affects the ranking of a given country. Most 
importantly, the old member states have a significantly higher interest group 
density per seat in the EP than younger member states. Moreover, in line with 
our expectations we find evidence that not only economic but also cultural 
resources play a role in accounting for the number of national organised inter-
ests lobbying the EP. Both countries with a large economy as well as those with a 
large share of the population active in voluntary associations have a high num-
ber of interest representatives lobbying the EP. These findings have important 
implications for understanding national representation in EU lobbying as well 
as for future theorising about the density of organised interests.
Lobbying the European Parliament
As already mentioned, the strengthened role of the EP and its increased rel-
evance as a venue for organised interests active in EU lobbying has not gone 
unnoticed in the literature (Lehmann 2009). Studies of EP lobbying have for 
example examined the access of organised interests to the EP and other institu-
tions (see e.g. Bouwen 2004; Dür and Mateo 2012; Eising 2007), the strategies of 
organised interests with respect to who to lobby in the EP (e.g. Marshall 2010, 
2015) as well as the lobbying success of organised interest groups in the EP (e.g. 
Baroni 2014; Rasmussen 2015). Our aim is to explain cross-national variation 
WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS  1135
in the number of organised interests lobbying the EP. Our focus is thus not on 
explaining which elements at the level of individual, national groups determine 
whether they decide to actively lobby the EP (see e.g. Dür and Mateo 2012; 
Eising 2007) but in understanding country-level differences in the representa-
tion of organised interests at a higher level of aggregation.
Representation is a complex phenomenon involving many different dimen-
sions, such as: are elected politicians representative in terms of descriptive 
characteristics (e.g. race, gender)? Do they enact policies in line with the sub-
stantive interests of their constituencies (see Pitkin 1967)? We are interested in 
the descriptive representation of different geographical areas, or what has been 
referred as ‘territorial representation’ in work comparing the opinion of voters 
and MEPs in different EU countries (Marsh and Wessels 1997). In the EU litera-
ture on interest representation, a distinction has sometimes been made between 
studies examining ‘territorial interest representation’ of EU subnational entities 
(regions and localities) and those examining ‘functional interest representation’ 
of different substantive interests such as business versus labour (Knodt 2011). 
These different forms of interest representation have been portrayed as occur-
ring in different types of arenas even if there is not necessarily a strong cleavage 
between functional and territorial interest representation in practice. In fact, 
many commonalities can be found in the strategies of regions and interest 
groups (Knodt 2011; see also Tatham 2017). Therefore, we do not depart from 
the assumption that interest organisations always represent a specific type of 
interest or contribute to a specific form of representation, be it ‘territorial’, ‘func-
tional’ or maybe sometimes even ‘party political’. Instead, organised interests 
may represent and align different types of interests in practice.
Understanding representation of interest representatives from the different 
member states in EU institutions such as the European Parliament is important 
in the EU which ‒ despite sharing many attributes of a political system ‒ is 
not a state (Hix and Hoyland 2011). As a result of variation in both the level 
of regulation and regulatory traditions across the EU member states, policy 
negotiations in Brussels often need to find compromises between different 
political parties and different national interests. In such negotiations, interest 
organisations not only speak on behalf of specific substantive interests but 
may also represent distinct national approaches to tackling a given policy 
issue. Therefore, organised interests of the same type – such as trade unions 
or business groups – from different member states do not always represent a 
unified front on a given issue. Similarly, MEPs from a given party group within 
the EP may sometimes be divided according to their national affiliation. This 
emphasises the need to consider how actors from different EU member states 
are represented in the EU, not only in the formal EU bodies but also in the 
population of interest representatives. Existing research makes it clear that 
alongside European associations, national associations continue mobilising 
and getting access to the EP (e.g. Bouwen 2004; Eising 2007).
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Explaining variation in national groups
We share the interest of scholars studying the density of interest groups (Gray 
and Lowery 2000) in modelling differences in the number of organised inter-
ests across ‘aggregate units’ (in our case: countries). However, we expand the 
focus of the existing cross-national studies. These have focused on explaining 
variation in the number of trade and business associations (Bischoff 2003; 
Coates et al. 2007) or that of interest representatives that attend the ministerial 
conferences of the WTO (Hanegraaff et al. 2015). The number of groups present 
in political venues is not only important in its own right but also because it 
may impact on other aspects of interest representation, such as the strategies 
and potential lobbying success of groups as well as the performance of the 
political system as a whole (Berkhout et al. 2015; Messer et al. 2011).7 Similar 
to work done by interest group population ecologists on the US states (Gray 
and Lowery 2000), we focus on the structural determinants of the activity of 
organised interests from different territorial entities. Our explicit focus is on 
how the supply of resources (or the ‘area’) available to groups affects the num-
ber of groups lobbying the EP. We also control for demand-side factors that 
might create an incentive for them to mobilise. According to Berkhout et al. 
(2015: 464), the EU system may be a least likely case for finding an effect of 
supply-side explanations given the ‘long causal chain between “supply” factors 
and the actual lobbying venue’, whereas considerable support for demand-side 
effects were found in early work in this context (see e.g. Broscheid and Coen 
2003). Moreover, we add to existing work on population ecology in interest 
group research by considering not only economic but also cultural resources 
as a factor that might affect the capacity of national groups to lobby the EP.
To begin with, the literature on organised interests contains no lack of 
accounts of how economic resources affect the mobilisation of individual 
groups. The interest group community in both the EU and elsewhere has often 
been accused of being ‘biased’ towards resourceful groups (Rasmussen and 
Carroll 2014; Schattschneider 1960; Schlozman 1984). Access to resources 
should make it easier for national interest representatives to expand the range of 
their lobbying activities from the national to the supranational level. Mobilising 
at the EU level requires resources to monitor policy-making, to design and 
implement strategies and to forge alliances with other stakeholders (for a sim-
ilar argument related to transnational advocacy, see Hanegraaff et al. 2015). 
In work on the mobilisation of subnational governments in Brussels, Marks 
et al. (1996) speak of a ‘resource push’: a greater amount of financial resources 
facilitates EU-level activity.
In a similar way, explanations of the density of organised interests by interest 
group population ecologists attach high emphasis to the importance of eco-
nomic factors when it comes to explaining the number of groups. Just as bio-
logical species depend on resources for their survival, the number of groups is 
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expected to be constrained by the economic resources available in their environ-
ment (Berkhout et al. 2015; Gray and Lowery 2000). According to population 
ecology, increases in organisational constituents will result in larger popula-
tions because more constituents should make it possible for organisations to 
represent niches of interests that are narrower and more specific. Moreover, 
the number of interest groups is not only affected by the number of potential 
constituents (e.g. the number of firms in the case of a business association) but 
also by the wealth of those constituents given that better-endowed interests are 
more likely to mobilise in the first place (Berkhout et al. 2015).
In line with such a logic, work on the density of national trade associations 
has found evidence that economic development stimulates a higher number 
of interest groups (Bischoff 2003; Coates et al. 2007). Economic development 
lowers the costs of group mobilisation through better transportation and infor-
mation infrastructure, which makes it easier to both form and maintain organ-
ised interests (Bischoff 2003). It also increases the total number of interests in a 
society through labour specialisation, product differentiation and the growing 
choice of products and activities that consumers with additional income pos-
sess. Our expectation is therefore that the economic resources of a country can 
help stimulate the activity of organised interests. However, importantly, we do 
not expect the relationship between economic resources and interest group 
density to be linear. As argued by population ecologists, decreasing returns to 
scale will mean that the marginal utility of additional groups will start declin-
ing at some point as more resources become available (Berkhout et al. 2015). 
Our first hypothesis is therefore that the number of organised interests from a 
country lobbying the European Parliament increases with its amount of economic 
resources but at a declining rate.
Yet, apart from economic resources, historical legacies and cultural traditions 
might also be important among the supply-side factors that stimulate the number 
of organised interests from a country. Putnam (1993) has for example argued 
that a country’s legacy with respect to associational engagement may have an 
impact on the status of its current civil society (see also Bailer et al. 2013). Such 
associational activity has often been regarded as an important component of the 
concept of ‘social capital’, which is a term used to evaluate the quality of the social 
environment among people (Coleman 1990: 304; Putnam 1995). The idea is 
that citizens acquire social capital through their interactions and networks with 
others. This social capital may help them achieve their goals more effectively and 
have a positive impact on societal governance more generally. Even if the usage 
of the concept of social capital in the recent literature has not escaped criticism 
(e.g. Jackman and Miller 1998), several studies have provided evidence of a link 
between social capital and the effectiveness of public governance (e.g. Andrews 
2011; Cusack 1999; Putnam 1993). Rather than referring to the general concept 
of social capital, which aggregates many different sub-dimensions (e.g. Putnam 
2000), we look directly at support for voluntary associations.
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Such support and engagement in civil society organisations can serve as 
a foundation for the maintenance of a strong lobbying presence not only at 
the national but also the supranational level. It may for example increase the 
level of political sophistication within a given society, which will in turn help 
overcome potential collective action problems and ensure that citizen demands 
are articulated (Boix and Posner 1998; Putnam 1993). According to Putnam 
(1993: 183), ‘Where norms and networks of civic engagement are lacking, the 
outlook for collective action appears bleak’. A higher stock of associational 
capital makes it more likely that collective action takes place resulting in a 
higher degree of policy activism by which citizens and organised interests aim 
to monitor and influence government (Andrews 2011; Tavits 2006). The idea 
is that participation in voluntary association stimulates a learning process in 
which national actors become more exposed to information and the benefits 
of actively engaging in policy activism such as EP lobbying. In a study on the 
mobilisation of subnational governments in Brussels, Marks et al. use a simi-
lar line of reasoning. They argue ‘that the skills and habit developed within a 
strong associational culture may spill over into public life’ (Marks et al. 1996: 
169) and exert a positive influence on the likelihood of having regional rep-
resentation in Brussels. Accordingly, the regions with the strongest associational 
culture should be the ones most visible in the lobbying landscape. Even if 
their data requires them to test this argument via an indirect proxy (the share 
of the workforce in the industrial sector), they find considerable support for 
the idea. Following the argumentation above, our second hypothesis is that 
there is a positive relationship between the share of the public active in voluntary 
associations and the number of organised interests from a country lobbying the 
European Parliament.
Data and variables
To examine the density of interest group representatives from different coun-
tries in the EP, we rely on a dataset collected for INTEREURO, an international 
research project examining multiple facets of interest group lobbying in the 
EU and its member states (Beyers et al. 2014). The population consists of all 
organisations that held a ‘doorpass’ to access the EP building for any period of 
time between 2005 and 2009. Given our focus on national groups lobbying the 
EP, using a register for this institution only is key for us. The data for a five-year 
period allows us also to control for short-term fluctuations in the representation 
of organised interests from different countries. Importantly, this period was 
not marked by radical changes in the use of the register itself in comparison 
to the EU’s Transparency Register. The latter has experienced several changes 
in the rules guiding registration and witnessed a steep increase in the number 
of registrants ever since its introduction in 2011. Relying on the INTEREURO 
coded dataset also gives us the distinct advantage that we do not have to rely on 
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self-reported information about the groups that has been the subject of criticism 
(ALTER-EU 2012). Moreover, our INTEREURO doorpass data enable us to 
single out groups by using the coded information about the scope of interest 
that they represent.8
From our dataset we select all organised interests that are headquartered in an 
EU member state and represent national or subnational interests. To create our 
dependent variable, we aggregate numbers of groups across the entire five-year 
period to smooth out marginal differences over time and to construct density 
measures based on the largest possible number of organised interests. The number 
of groups varies only marginally over time as our data are for a relatively short 
time period. The main variation is thus cross-national and not time-varying, 
such that cross-sectional variation is the main focus of our explanation.9
In total, 693 business associations, firms, citizen groups, labour and profes-
sional associations, institutions, national authorities and other actors from the 
member states are present in the registry for this period. Rather than restricting 
the term ‘organised interest’ to membership associations, we are thus employing 
a broader, behavioural definition, which classifies actors ‘based on their observ-
able, policy related activities’ (Baroni et al. 2014: 142; see also Beyers et al. 2008). 
Among these groups, 112 are located in Belgium, whose capital Brussels hosts 
not only central government authorities but also the EP itself, giving its organ-
ised interests a unique advantage in terms of access to this institution. Because 
of this exceptionalism, we exclude Belgium from the analyses that follow.
The first part of our empirical analysis explores national differences in den-
sity. Rather than only considering the raw number of groups, we also examine 
relative density measures, thus placing the number of groups in relation to 
different benchmarks. Already when Gray and Lowery published their seminal 
book they emphasised that: 
While a raw number of interest organizations provides a starting point for meas-
uring interest population density, it is not obvious that by itself it is an adequate 
indicator. Density is a relational concept … Therefore, numbers of organizations 
must be compared to some frame of reference to give the indicator meaning in 
terms of the underlying concept of density. (Gray and Lowery 2000: 86)
We therefore compare different density measures such as: (a) absolute den-
sity (i.e. the number of groups per country); (2) GDP per organised interest; 
(3) citizens per organised interest; and (4) EP seats per organised interest. This 
helps us to give more nuanced answers to the broader question of representation 
to which our work relates.
The second part of the analysis aims at explaining variation in density 
between countries. Our main goal is to examine the explanatory power of cul-
tural versus economic resources. Following Gray and Lowery (2000) we model 
the absolute number of organised interests in this part of our article. According 
to Gray and Lowery, such a strategy is advantageous given that relative density 
measures (such as citizens per organised interest) are not 
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natural entities that act or are acted on directly. They are products or artifacts 
of what happens to numbers of interest organizations in relation to something 
else … Therefore, when our focus shifts to explanation … attention will be given 
exclusively to interest organization numbers. (Gray and Lowery 2000: 107–8)
We model the differences in density by regressing the total count of organised 
interests on two main independent variables that capture economic and cultural 
resources, respectively, and controlling for alternative explanations. With the 
exception of our measure of cultural resources (described below), we average 
the independent variables over the 2005–2009 period.
For economic resources, we measure the size of a country’s economy by its 
GDP (obtained from Eurostat). Because we do not expect a linear relationship 
between economic size and density but instead one that reflects diminish-
ing marginal returns to economic size (that is, the effect of wealth on density 
remains positive but diminishes in magnitude with wealth), we take the loga-
rithm of this variable.
For cultural resources we use a measure of associational membership adapted 
from Norris (2003). We construct the measure based on a question included 
irregularly in Eurobarometer surveys. Respondents are asked to select from 
a list of 14 types of voluntary membership organisations10 (and one residual 
choice for membership organisations not included in the 14) the ones to which 
they belong. We then take the share of respondents who indicate member-
ship in any one category of voluntary organisations. Using survey weights, we 
finally determine the share of citizens in each member state that belong to such 
organisations. Within our time period from 2005 to 2009, only Eurobarometer 
66.3 (fieldwork conducted in 2006) includes the question, so we construct our 
measure from this survey alone. Among the 26 member states used in the 
analysis, the average national share of individuals participating in voluntary 
organisations is 31% with a low of 10% (Bulgaria) and a high of 60% (Austria).11
As mentioned, the number of national groups may not only be a question 
of the capacity but also the incentive of groups from a given country to seek 
rents from mobilising. Hence, organised interests from some countries may 
have a higher incentive to be active in the European Parliament than others. 
Therefore, we control for two additional factors that represent incentives for 
organised interests to mobilise at the EP. The first represents EU expenditures 
in each of the member states and measures the direct transfers to each country 
(in billions of euros), obtained from the website of the Directorate-General 
for Budget. The amount of EU fiscal transfers such as transfers of structural 
funds or agricultural subsidies to different member states varies so that some 
are greater beneficiaries of EU funds than others. This might provide inter-
est groups from these countries with a greater incentive to maintain a strong 
presence in Brussels. The second reflects a country’s reliance on trade within 
the EU and outside it. Groups from countries with high trade integration may 
be more ‘energised’ to get involved in lobbying the EU institutions since the 
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EU regulatory environment ultimately affects them more (Rasmussen and 
Alexandrova 2012) (for a similar argument, see also Broscheid and Coen 
2007; Cram 1998; Richardson and Mazey 2015). The internal market policies 
of the EU will be likely to draw national, organised interests from countries 
that benefit from trade within the EU. EU customs and competition policies 
will provide incentives for groups to mobilise from countries that benefit from 
external trade. Hence we measure trade reliance as the total value of imports 
and exports both with member states and with non-member states standardised 
by a country’s GDP.
Density of national, organised interests
Table 1 shows cross-national differences in the density of organised interests 
from the EP doorpass registry using four alternative measures. The first is a 
simple count of the number of organised interests per country, and the table 
ranks the countries according to this measure (which will be the dependent 
variable in the next section). Germany has the most organised interests in the 










Germany 148 1 3991 8 556 9 0.67 3
Belgium 112 2 734 1 95 1 0.21 1
France 95 3 4854 15 669 12 0.81 4
italy 89 4 4258 10 665 11 0.86 5
united 
Kingdom
74 5 6328 17 825 13 1.04 8
netherlands 43 6 3248 4 381 4 0.62 2
spain `36 7 7059 18 1244 15 1.48 10
sweden 19 8 4160 9 480 7 0.99 7
austria 18 9 3715 6 460 6 0.99 6
Denmark 13 10 4278 11 420 5 1.06 9
Finland 8 11 5381 16 660 10 1.73 11
romania 6 12 4669 14 3495 20 3.43 16
Hungary 6 13 3958 7 1677 17 3.93 17
ireland 5 14 8727 19 866 14 2.56 13
poland 5 15 15,032 22 7628 22 10.64 21
slovenia 4 16 2088 3 503 8 1.75 12
Greece 4 17 13,614 21 2793 19 5.90 18
cyprus 2 18 1954 2 381 3 3.00 14
luxembourg 2 19 4366 12 238 2 3.00 15
estonia 1 20 3542 5 1345 16 6.00 19
latvia 1 21 4567 13 2208 18 8.80 20
slovakia 1 22 13,261 20 5375 21 13.80 22
czech 
republic
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register with a total of 148, while Bulgaria, Lithuania, Malta and Portugal had 
none during the examined period. The average number of organised interests 
per country is 22.4 (including Belgium it is 25.7), but most countries have fewer 
organised interests than the mean. The standard deviation of 37.7 is well above 
the mean, indicating a high variability.
The remaining columns of Table 1 show the density of organised interests 
in the EP in relation to three alternative benchmarks. The analysis is limited 
to those countries with at least one organised interest present. Beside each of 
these benchmarks is a ranking of each country in order of descending density. 
As the benchmarks all measure density inversely, the ranking is in ascending 
order of the values for each country.
We start by looking at GDP in relation to groups. Interest group research 
often emphasises how economic resources serve as an important basis of group 
activity (Schattschneider 1960; Schlozman and Tierney 1986). As a result, Gray 
and Lowery (2000) suggest using the size of the economy as a benchmark 
when assessing the number of groups. In order to do so, the column labelled 
GDP represents the gross domestic product in millions of euros per organised 
interest. It relies on the average GDP for each country across the five-year 
period for its construction. This measure of ‘representational economic den-
sity’ (Gray and Lowery 2000: 89) is an inverse measure of density as higher 
values indicate fewer groups relative to the size of a country’s economy. It 
ranges from €734 million per group (Belgium) to €32,591 million per group 
(Czech Republic) with a means of €6799 and €7075 million per group with 
and without Belgium, respectively. Excluding Belgium, the densest countries 
with respect to this benchmark are a diverse set that includes countries with 
few organised interests (Cyprus and Slovenia) and one with a relatively high 
number of interest groups (the Netherlands).
The next benchmark we use is population. It measures the number of inhab-
itants (in thousands) in a country per organised interest (with population 
averaged across the five-year period). As with the previous measure it is an 
inverse density measure, with lower values indicating fewer inhabitants per 
group and hence higher density. Density using this benchmark ranges from 
95,000 inhabitants per group for Belgium (the next highest is Luxembourg with 
238,000 inhabitants per group) to over 10 million inhabitants per group present 
in the EP for the Czech Republic. This measure has an average of 1,881,000 
inhabitants per group (or 1,962,000 inhabitants per group excluding Belgium). 
Countries that rank high on representational economic density tend to rank 
high on this measure as well, but there are some notable exceptions. Hungary 
drops from the seventh position in terms of GDP to the seventeenth position 
in terms of population; Estonia drops from the fifth to the sixteenth position 
and Luxembourg rises from the twelfth to the second position.
Finally, the last benchmark we use concerns representational political den-
sity and looks at the relationship between the number of organised interests 
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from a country and its number of official MEPs in the European Parliament. 
The measure – calculated as the number of EP seats per organised interest – is 
also a measure of inverse density. On the one hand, the densest member states 
with respect to this benchmark are also the oldest member states: Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Germany, France and Italy are five of the six founding members 
of the European Economic Community. On the other hand, the least dense 
member states are all new member states (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, 
Latvia and Estonia occupy the highest ranks for this measure). The measure 
ranges from 0.2 (or 0.7 if Belgium is excluded) to 23.6 EP seats per organised 
interest with an average of 4.2 and 4.4 with and without Belgium, respectively.
Thus although there are similarities in the ranking of countries when using 
these alternative benchmarks, the differences that remain suggest that assess-
ments of the degree to which countries are represented by organised interests 
lobbying the EP depend to some extent on the chosen criterion of representation. 
Given the high correlation between GDP and population in EU countries, the dif-
ference in ranking between economic representation and representation by pop-
ulation is relatively small, with wealthy, smaller countries and relatively poorer 
but larger countries driving the differences observed. The departure from pure 
proportionality in EP seats (Delgado-Márquez et al. 2013) means that the ranking 
of EP seats per group differs from that of population per group. Remarkably, a 
pattern emerges for the former that follows the duration of EU membership.
Variation in national numbers of organised interests
As a next step, we now explore variation in the number of organised interests 
in the EP doorpass registry from 2005 to 2009 for 26 EU countries (every 
member state during that period except Belgium). As our dependent variable 
Table 2. negative binomial regression explaining density.
note:*p < 0.1;; **p < 0.05;; ***p < 0.01.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log of GDp 1.061*** 1.064*** 1.038***
(0.084) (0.045) (0.091)
associational membership 0.059*** 0.020*** 0.020***
(0.020) (0.004) (0.005)




constant −23.973*** 1.009 −24.789*** −24.225***
(2.138) (0.714) (1.195) (2.224)
McFadden pseudo-r2 0.26 0.03 0.34 0.34
observations 26 26 26 26
log likelihood −74.556 −97.345 −65.994 −65.878
Θ 6.284 0.451*** 462.840 381.521 
(1756.730) (1184.140)(4.050) (0.122)
akaike inf. crit. 153.113 198.689 137.989 141.755
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is an overdispersed count of the number of organised interests, we estimate 
these models in Table 2 using negative binomial regressions. Because the raw 
coefficients of negative binomial regression models do not have a straightfor-
ward interpretation, we include the exponentiated coefficients in Table 3. The 
first model is a bivariate regression model of the number of organised interests 
on the logarithm of a country’s GDP, the independent variable that represents 
a country’s economic resources. The effect of this variable on density is as 
expected: a larger economy is associated with a higher density (p < 0.01). The 
Table 3. negative binomial regression explaining density (exponentiated coefficients).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log of GDp 2.890 2.898 2.823
(0.084) (0.045) (0.091)
associational membership 1.060 1.020 1.020
(0.020) (0.004) (0.005)




constant 0.000 2.744 0.000 0.000
(2.138) (0.714) (1.195) (2.224)
Figure 1. plot of predicted density vs. GDp.
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pseudo-R2 is relatively high for this model (0.26), indicating that economic 
resources are a very strong predictor of density.
The second model is also bivariate and uses instead the variable that repre-
sents a country’s cultural resources. Its effect is as hypothesised: a greater share 
of individuals who participate in one or more voluntary associations is associ-
ated with a higher density (p < 0.01). Although the variable is significant, the 
model fit (pseudo-R2 = 0.03) does not reach the level observed in Model 1. In 
Model 3 we combine the two main variables whose effects remain significant. 
Note that the correlation between associational membership and the logarithm 
of GDP is moderate (r = 0.35) but the effect of both variables are significant. 
Finally, Model 4 introduces controls for EU direct transfers and trade depend-
ence. Both variables are correlated with economic resources, justifying their 
inclusion as control variables.12 Neither of them are significant but the variables 
representing economic and cultural resources are robust to this specification 
(for both variables, p < 0.01).
Table 3 allows for a more intuitive substantive interpretation of the coeffi-
cients in the negative binomial models. When the coefficient from a negative 
Figure 2. plot of predicted density vs. voluntary association.
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binomial model is exponentiated, the resulting value (referred to in some con-
texts as the incidence rate ratio) can be interpreted as the marginal factor change 
in the dependent variable for a one-unit change in the independent variable. 
Increasing the logarithm of a country’s GDP by one increases the expected 
density by a factor of nearly three in the three models in which that variable is 
present. The effect of a change in the logarithm of a country’s GDP is in itself not 
substantively meaningful, so Figure 1  plots the expected number of organised 
interests for changes in raw GDP along with the 95% confidence interval and 
with all other variables held constant at their means. The figures underline the 
substantial effect of GDP on the predicted number of groups as GDP moves 
within its observed range.
Considering cultural resources, according to Table 3, a one percentage point 
increase in the proportion of individuals who participate in national associa-
tional life increases the expected density of groups present in the EP by a factor 
of 1.02 (Models 3 and 4). Figure 2 plots the expected number of organised 
interests for changes in this variable along with its 95% confidence interval and 
shows a modest increase in the predicted density across the observed range 
of this variable.
Conclusion
Even if interest groups are widely perceived as playing a crucial role in European 
governance and may represent both territorial and functional interests, existing 
interest group research has paid little attention to the descriptive representation 
of organised interests from different member states. Focusing on the case of 
the EP and relying on a new, unique dataset of actors registered to lobby this 
institution we conduct a comparative study of the density of national organised 
interests. We first argue that density is a relational concept and show how the 
density rank is affected by the benchmark employed. Countries with a high 
number of interest groups per MEP are among the oldest members of the EU 
and not necessarily the same ones as those that score highest when we examine 
the number of organised interests in relation to the size of the economy or the 
size of the population.
Second, we present a systematic explanation of the number of organised 
interests from different member states in the lobbying community of the EP. 
We focus on those factors which might affect the capacity of national organ-
ised interests to be represented in the EP lobbying community and control for 
factors that might affect their incentives to mobilise. In contrast to existing 
studies of the density of organised interests we draw specific attention to not 
only economic but also cultural resources.
Even if it has been argued that the EU might be a least likely case for find-
ing strong support that supply-side factors affect density, we find strong sup-
port that not only economic but also cultural resources affect the number of 
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organised interests from a country. Both the size of the national economy as well 
as the level of organisational engagement of the population are highly signifi-
cant when it comes to explaining variation in the national number of interest 
groups. That the number of groups in the EP is constrained by the economic 
resources available in the environment in which they operate delivers strong 
support for the work of interest group population ecologists (e.g. Berkhout 
et al. 2015; Gray and Lowery 2000). We add to this work by emphasising the role 
which cultural resources play as a foundation for the maintenance of a strong 
lobbying presence at the supranational level. Citizens’ associational engagement 
might help to overcome collective action problems of mobilising and stimulate 
learning processes that help organised interests to develop an effective supra-
national lobbying presence.
Importantly, the reason many countries do not have a strong presence of 
interest groups in the EP is therefore not only related to low levels of economic 
resources but also to the fact that they have a small engagement in organised 
civil society to begin with. This issue is relevant in the new Eastern and Central 
European member states that do not have the same tradition of civil society 
involvement as many older Western European member states (see also Cekik 
2017). For them, a lobbying presence in Brussels is unlikely to result from 
increasing trade and fiscal transfers as long as their civil society engagement 
remains weak. Strong trade integration into the EU and fiscal transfers will still 
be beneficial for their economies but will not in themselves stimulate stronger 
involvement in EU lobbying.
There is potential to scrutinise the explanatory potential of associational 
engagement further in future work on interest group density when addi-
tional interest group population data are coded and when more associational 
engagement data from cross-national surveys on the EU member states become 
available. Future research should also expand our study of national differ-
ences in organised interests in the EP to other lobbying venues. Moreover, 
even if research at the national level of lobbying in several arenas or venues 
(e.g. Binderkrantz et al. 2015) leads us to expect that there is likely to be a 
high correlation between the number of national groups lobbying the EP and 
other venues, there is potential to extend our approach to other venues for EU 
lobbying. Examining the determinants of having a strong lobbying presence 
is particularly important in the European Union, which is designed in such a 
way that it is highly dependent on interest representatives from its different 
member states to secure input legitimacy.
Notes
1.  http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/lisbon_
treaty/ai0010_en.htm (accessed 20 March 2015).
2.  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?language=EN&type=IM-PRE
SS&reference=20070910BKG10267 (accessed 22 March 2015).
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3.  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+IM-PR
ESS+20071008IPR11353+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN (accessed 22 March 2015).
4.  http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/homePage.do?redir=false& 
locale=en (accessed 24 April 2015).
5.  Focusing on the EP has the advantage that it enables us to look at country-level 
representation not only with respect to benchmarks for the size of the economy 
and population but also with respect to representatives from a country in the 
European Parliament.
6.  http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/civil_society/general_overview_en.htm#9 
(accessed 22 March 2015).
7.  There is disagreement on whether a higher number of groups impact on 
governmental performance in a positive or negative way. According to ‘pluralists’, 
a higher number of groups might help ensure a smoother transmission of public 
preferences to policy-makers whereas another prominent view expects a higher 
number of groups to increase the likelihood that policies are biased away from 
the interest of the median voter (for a review of this literature, see Rasmussen 
et al. 2014).
8.  The downside to using the EP doorpass data for 2005 to 2009 is that the 
population data are not as up-to-date as in the Transparency Register. However, 
because questions about associational engagement have not been asked in recent 
Eurobarometer surveys, we could not relate this variable to the latest version 
of the Transparency data.
9.  Another important reason for not exploiting the time dimension in the EP 
data between 2005 and 2009 is that that we do not have yearly measures of 
associational engagement for the period.
10.  These include recreational organisations (sports or outdoor clubs); education, 
arts, music or cultural associations; trade unions; business or professional 
organisations; consumer organisations; international organisations; 
organisations for environmental protection or animal rights; charity or social 
aid organisations; leisure associations for the elderly; organisations for the 
defence of elderly rights; religious or church organisations; political parties 
or organisations; organisations defending the interests of patients and/or the 
disabled; and other interest groups for specific causes such as women, people 
with specific sexual orientations, or local issues.
11.  In a related study, Messer et al. (2011) use the number of EU citizens active 
in groups related to a social policy area (or ‘guild’) to measure the potential 
number of constituents for groups in the area active in EU lobbying, which they 
expect to be positively related to actual numbers of groups. Instead we use the 
overall share of associational engagement to measure the cultural capital of a 
country. What matters to us is therefore the relative support for associations in 
the electorate rather than absolute number of citizens participating in groups.
12.  By this token, population should also be included as a control variable, but the 
very high degree of correlation between population and GDP in EU countries 
introduces significant multicollinearity to models containing both variables. 
Because of the likely effect of length of EU membership on density and its 
moderate correlation with associational engagement, this variable might also 
be included as a control variable, but the low number of observations limits the 
possibility for additional controls. Nevertheless, the results are robust when the 
length of EU membership is added to the final model.
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